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1. The emergence of modern metaphysics of science 
 
The label ‘metaphysics of science’ is one that has come to be used to refer to a philosophical sub-
discipline that has been gaining momentum for roughly forty years. The emergence of this sub-
discipline has been made possible by the (perhaps partial) recovery of metaphysics from the blow 
dealt to it by the Neo-Humean empiricist movements of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Without this recovery, not only would the metaphysics of science be non-existent as a discipline, the 
term ‘metaphysics of science’ would come close to being an oxymoron. The reason for this is that 
according to the aforementioned empiricist views (for example Carnap 1935, Ayer 1936 and Schlick 
1938), metaphysical statements have little meaning because, unlike the statements of natural 
science, they are typically neither analytic nor a posteriori. On this view, the metaphysics of science 
becomes a discipline in which philosophers ultimately say meaningless things about natural science, 
which is itself characterised (in part) by the fact that it is meaningful above all other disciplines. 
Clearly, this would make the metaphysics of science pointless in a way that is ironic. 
    
Fortunately, many of the concepts and debates which were cast into the bonfire by these radical 
empiricist movements have regained currency, and even if there is much disagreement between 
metaphysicians of science on the issues they debate, there is at least an assumption that 
philosophers can have meaningful debates about such issues. The main aim of this chapter is to try 
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to identify in general terms what those issues are. More precisely, we will address the following two 
questions amongst others. First, what do the various debates falling within the metaphysics of 
science have in common, if anything? Second, what distinguishes a question within the metaphysics 
of science from questions in other areas of metaphysics? 
    
Answering the above questions is no easy task, but as a way of beginning to illustrate the sorts of 
debates that take place within the metaphysics of science, let us say a little about the debate on 
whether science supports the view that there are necessities in nature. This is an appropriate 
starting point for two reasons. First, the concept of necessity in nature is the kind of metaphysical 
concept that the Neo-Humean empiricists described above were arguably sceptical of above all 
others. Second, the point at which philosophers began to take a renewed interest in the debate 
concerning necessity in nature arguably marked the point at which the modern discipline of 
metaphysics of science began. 
    
The main reason why empiricists had been so hostile towards metaphysical concepts, such as that of 
natural necessity, is that these concepts were not thought to be sufficiently grounded in experience. 
If a concept is not grounded in some aspect of experience, then it was thought to be rendered 
utterly mysterious and insignificant.  If notions of natural necessity have any meaning at all, the 
Humean empiricists say, this is only because we have an internal (observable) feeling of inevitability 
which attends our observations of the regularities in the world. But such a feeling, existing as it does 
in the mind, is not what the notion of natural necessity was initially intended to capture.  
    
Now, one way of questioning these empiricist conclusions is to question the strict separation 
between metaphysical a priori statements on the one hand, and scientific a posteriori statements on 
the other. If one can successfully argue there to be a more subtle and complex relationship between 
metaphysical and scientific statements, one which allows there to be an interplay between 
metaphysics and natural science, then perhaps the empiricists’ anti-metaphysical conclusions can be 
avoided. In the 1970’s, these kinds of arguments did indeed start to emerge. At this time, there was 
a general feeling that science itself might support certain metaphysical claims, and in the other 
direction it was thought that scientific statements might themselves rest in some way on various 
metaphysical assumptions. The former point was strikingly made by Kripke (1972) and Putnam 
(1973) in the aforementioned debate about necessities in nature.  Not only did they argue there to 
be metaphysical necessities concerning natural kinds, such as that water is necessarily the 
compound H2O, but they argued this to be a form of a posteriori necessity; a kind of necessity that is 
revealed at least in part through scientific observation.  
    
Kripke and Putnam’s work arguably provided the springboard for debates about natural necessities 
in other aspects of nature. In 1975, Harré and Madden published a now too-little-discussed book in 
which they argued for a thoroughly anti-Humean metaphysical outlook, in the light of science, on 
which nature is seen to be full of causal powers bringing causal necessities to the world. This has 
since led to the development of many other causal power ontologies, such as those of Shoemaker 
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(1980), Cartwright (1999), Martin (1993), Ellis (2001), Molnar (2003), Mumford (2004) and Bird 
(2007). Interest in the causal variety of metaphysical necessity also led, in part, to new work on the 
related concept of lawhood, a concept already employed pervasively in natural science. 
Metaphysicians of science began to wonder whether, if we can have justified beliefs in other kinds of 
metaphysical necessities, there might be reasons also for taking scientific laws to be necessary. If so, 
then what grounds this necessity? If the laws are merely contingent, then what, if anything, explains 
the continuance of the laws? These questions were attracting new interest from metaphysicians of 
science, and one of the first full length studies on the issue of lawhood came in 1983 with the 
publication of Armstrong’s What is a Law of Nature?. Since then, the topic of lawhood has been at 
the heart of the discipline, along with those relating to the aforementioned notions of kindhood and 
causation. 
    
We do not wish to give the impression from what has been said thus far that all metaphysicians of 
science agree that scientific discoveries (or the very existence of science itself) support beliefs in 
metaphysical necessities of various kinds. On the contrary, there are many metaphysicians of science 
who can be said justifiably to be Humean in spirit. Such philosophers tend to claim that science is 
neither underpinned by, nor lends support to, metaphysical necessities relating to kindhood, 
lawhood and causation. What is clear, however, is that their engagement in these very issues shows 
that they think there are meaningful debates to be had in the area of metaphysics of science. This in 
itself, as we have tried to suggest, has marked a significant development in philosophy. 
    
We also do not wish to give the impression from what has been said so far that debates surrounding 
the issue of metaphysical necessity are the only debates within the metaphysics of science. But this 
general debate does provide a good illustration of how the feeling has emerged in some quarters 
that there is a mutual dependence between metaphysics and natural science. As we have suggested, 
the strong empiricism of the early twentieth century is typically now thought to be too radical and 
naive in its treatment of metaphysics. Likewise, an extreme rationalistic ‘armchair’ form of 
metaphysics, which does not engage with the current discoveries of science, is also thought to be 
misguided. There is an increasing feeling that the best scientists and metaphysicians are those who 
talk to each other. 
    
Before beginning our search for a more detailed definition of the metaphysics of science, it is worth 
mentioning a more recent trend within modern metaphysics of science, one which has emerged 
during the past decade or so. This is the project of system building. As has been briefly indicated 
already (and as will be shown further as the chapter proceeds), the core scientific concepts of 
kindhood, lawhood and causation are interrelated, and this has led some philosophers to attempt to 
build ontological systems which can simultaneously account for the nature of kindhood, lawhood 
and causation. These systems can even be seen as attempts to underpin the entire body of scientific 
statements, bearing in mind that scientific statements typically relate in some way to kinds, laws or 
causal facts. This ‘underpinning’ is often described in the now popular terminology of truthmaking. 
The modern system builders have been concerned with what it is that makes scientific statements 
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true. What is it, for example, that makes it the case that a scientific law either does or does not 
hold? Various answers seem possible, or at least imaginable, which indeed explains why there are 
debates to be had within the discipline of metaphysics of science. This also indicates, in part, what 
was wrong with the radical empiricists of the first half of the twentieth century. Whilst these 
empiricists rightly took scientific statements seriously, they did not ask in virtue of what these 
statements might be true, overlooking important philosophical issues as a result.  
    
Answers that current system builders have given concerning the metaphysical underpinnings of 
science have varied considerably. Ellis (2001), for example, has argued that our total body of 
scientific statements can only be accounted for if we accept a metaphysical system containing six 
fundamental ontological categories. E.J. Lowe (2006), in contrast, argues that only his four-category 
ontology provides an adequate metaphysical foundation for natural science. Heil (2003) is more 
parsimonious still, arguing for a two-category ontology. The debates between the system builders 
within the metaphysics of science are ongoing. But again, the very existence of these debates shows 
that the presuppositions which have led to the emergence of the metaphysics of science remain, 
and that the discipline is in a state of health. 
 
 
2. The beginnings of a definition 
 
So far, we have identified some of the metaphysical-cum-scientific concepts that metaphysicians of 
science are concerned with: natural kinds, laws, causation and causal power. This immediately gives 
us a sense of what the metaphysics of science, as the term is now commonly used, is not. One 
obvious interpretation of the metaphysics of science could be that it is the study of specific 
metaphysical debates as they arise within specific scientific sub-disciplines. A notorious example is 
the debate concerning absolute versus relative conceptions of space, which was contested for 
example by the Newtonians and Einsteinians. Whilst this is a metaphysical debate which has been 
scientifically informed, this is not the kind of debate with which contemporary metaphysicians of 
science are typically concerned.
1
 They are rather concerned with debating the more general 
scientific-cum-metaphysical concepts, concepts which are deployed in all the natural sciences, 
including the special sciences. Chemists, for example, speak of chemical kinds and properties, and 
chemical laws concerning those kinds and properties. Biologists speak of their own biological kinds 
and laws. Psychologists identify psychological laws, and so on. In contrast, the concepts of, say, 
absolute and relational space, are not common to all the sciences: they are specifically concepts 
developed within the discipline of physics. This point shows again how the system-builders within 
the metaphysics of science are extremely ambitious: they claim to offer a metaphysical system 
which can underpin all branches of natural science. 
                                                          
1
 This is not to say that papers on metaphysical issues in specific branches of science do not sometimes fall 
under the heading of ‘metaphysics of science’ in conferences, for example. Our point is just that such papers 
are not at the core of the discipline as we understand it. 
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There are also other ways in which the term ‘metaphysics of science’ could be taken by someone not 
familiar with the history of the discipline.  One could think, for example, that the term ‘metaphysics 
of science’ refers to metaphysics in general, whilst conveying a sense that metaphysics should not 
depart too far from the concerns and discoveries of current science. Several current philosophers 
hold this kind of view, showing hostility to what we might call the ‘armchair metaphysicians’ who do 
not make an effort to engage with current science (see e.g. Ladyman & Ross 2007). It is clear, 
however, that this agenda is orthogonal to the concerns of those within the discipline of 
metaphysics of science. Those interested in studying the central metaphysical concepts within 
natural science may or may not disapprove of more abstract metaphysicians who think about issues 
which are less obviously connected with the subject-matter of current science. 
    
It is fairly clear, then, what the discipline of metaphysics of science is not. But can we say anything 
more insightful than merely identifying the kinds of concepts which metaphysicians of science 
investigate? Is there a common theme or aim running through each of the debates within the 
metaphysics of science? If the answer is yes, then a general definition of the discipline should be 
achievable, and such a definition may well be philosophically illuminating. It may, for example, 
reveal something about the essential nature of science itself.  
  
We believe that there is a common theme and aim running through each debate within the 
metaphysics of science, and the aim of the remainder of this chapter will be to begin to uncover it. 
However, the definition we will arrive at will have to be vague in some respects.  To aim for an exact 
definition would be unrealistic for a chapter-length piece, for reasons we will shortly explain. But 
regardless of how the precise details of the definition are to be spelled out, we hope that the 
general insights we offer will be clear and justified. 
  
One of the problems regarding the delineation of the metaphysics of science is that the definition of 
science is itself a matter of philosophical controversy. Some are even sceptical as to whether a sharp 
criterion for distinguishing science from non-science is possible (see for example Feyerabend 1975). 
The fact that there is an ever-increasing range of aims and methods within the various scientific 
disciplines lends weight to this scepticism. Philosophers cannot even agree on what kind of general 
entity science should be classified as. It has been taken at one time or another to be a set of 
statements, a set of propositions, a tool, a method, a research activity, an ideology, a research 
network, a research institution and even a philosophy, to name but a few proposals. 
    
There is however some agreement on what science is not. The radical empiricist view of science, 
mentioned earlier, now has few adherents. According to that view, science is distinguished by the 
fact that it is the only respectable discipline, as it is constituted by a set of statements which, unlike 
metaphysical statements, are meaningful. More precisely, scientific statements are said on this view 
to be meaningful insofar as they are either analytic (such as logical truths), or synthetic, which is to 
say they are verifiable in some way through empirical observation. However, formulating a synthetic 
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principle of verifiability in a satisfactory way proved extremely difficult, not to mention the fact that 
the very distinction between the analytic and synthetic was shown to be questionable (see Quine, 
1951). Each formulation of the proposed principle was subject to counterexamples, modified 
versions were subject to further counterexamples, and so on.  
    
These complaints led to a move away from trying to capture the nature of science in terms of the 
notion of verifiability. Famously, for example, Popper claimed that what is important and unique to 
science is not verifiability, but falsifiability. What distinguishes a genuine science from, say, astrology 
or Freudian analysis, according to Popper, is that its claims can be falsified by experiential anomalies. 
Science is risky. But this characterisation also came with problems. As Lakatos (1978) and Thagard 
(1978) point out, scientists do not automatically abandon their core theories when an evidential 
anomaly occurs, nor should they. Rather than accepting that their theories are false in light of 
recalcitrant observations, scientists look for alternative explanations for the anomalies, by 
questioning the reliability of their testing methods or questioning the auxiliary hypotheses which, in 
conjunction with the core theory, entail that the data in question is indeed anomalous. Furthermore, 
argues Lakatos, it is a good thing that scientists proceed in this way, for falsification strategems lead 
to overhasty rejections of sound theories (1978: 112).  
    
The above line of argument suggests that science involves, in part, finding ways of explaining new 
facts and ‘anomalies’ that arise (see also Thagard, 1978). Criticisms of previous demarcation criteria 
also led Lakatos and others to propose a further plausible distinguishing feature of genuine science. 
What genuine, progressive sciences have in common is that they predict facts, many of which are 
novel (1978). Popper appears to agree on this point also. (Popper’s view merely differs on the issue 
of what scientists should do when the novel predictions go wrong). For example, Popper presents 
Einstein’s gravitational theory as a paradigm case of a genuine scientific theory giving novel and 
strikingly precise predictions (as opposed to non-scientific theories which, according to Popper, are 
typically compatible with any outcome, such as Adlerian psychology and the Marxist theory of 
history (1957)). Einstein’s theory implies, for example, that light is attracted to very heavy bodies. 
This idea had not occurred to physicists before, nor did it seem to have any prima facie plausibility. 
Now, a consequence of this idea was that the light from a star whose apparent position is actually 
quite close to the sun would travel in such a direction that, to us, the star would appear to be slightly 
shifted away from the sun. Using data taken during a daytime eclipse, which allowed the stars close 
to the sun to be visible, it was discovered that Einstein’s prediction was indeed correct (Popper, 
1957). As Popper points out, this prediction was highly novel and also risky: had the star appeared 
not to have moved, or to have moved to a lesser or greater extent than expected, the theory would 
have been embarrassed. But given this highly novel prediction was accurate, Einstein’s theory was 
shown to be an instance of genuine, impressive science
2
. 
                                                          
2
 Note that although Einstein’s theory superseded Newtonianism, this does not detract from Newtonianism’s 
status as a genuine science, for it too made outstanding novel predictions, as Lakatos explains (1978). For 
example, contrary to the dominant views of comet motion, Newton’s theory entailed that some comets 
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We take it that for all the disagreements over the details of the correct definition of science, there 
are some general distinguishing features of science which most in the demarcation debate can agree 
on. Regardless of whether science is best understood as a set of statements or propositions, or say a 
research activity, what distinguishes a genuine science from mere pseudo-science, amongst other 
things, is that it makes predictions (many of which are novel), and provides explanations for new 
facts and anomalies. It is these main features that we will take into account in formulating our 
definition of the metaphysics of science. There is, of course, much more to be said about the 
demarcation of science, but the kind of demarcation criteria identified, rough as they are, will be 
sufficient to allow us to get across our main points concerning the metaphysics of science.
3
 
    
Taking into account the features of science we have identified thus far, and taking into account 
earlier comments, we may propose the following definition of the metaphysics of science, which we 
can then proceed to build upon: 
 
MOS def**:  The philosophical study of the general metaphysical notions that are applied 
in all our scientific disciplines, disciplines which offer novel predictions and provide 
explanations of new facts and anomalies within their given domain. 
 
Now, a question one might ask about the presence of these metaphysical notions in all scientific 
disciplines – such as those of kindhood, lawhood, causation and causal power – concerns whether it 
is an accident that these concepts are central to all of science. Our view is that it is not, and an 
exploration of why this is so will further our understanding of the nature of the metaphysics of 
science.  
    
The claim that it is not accidental that the notions of  kindhood, lawhood, and causation are at the 
heart of all the sciences suggests that without kinds, laws and causation, science as we know it 
would not even be possible. Given our partial definition of science, this is to say that without 
kindhood, lawhood and causation, neither systematic scientific predictions nor explanations would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
moved in hyperbolas, and others in parabolas. Using Newton’s theory, Halley predicted that a certain comet 
(now called ‘Halley’s Comet’, of course) moved in the former way, and that it would return in seventy two 
years time. Seventy two years later the comet did indeed return, and this took the credibility of Newton’s 
theory to yet further levels. 
3
 Classificatory work, for example, might also be said to be at the heart of natural science. It could be argued, 
however, that even this activity is not independent of that of providing predictions and explanations, since for 
example certain natural kind classifications have to be made before many laws can be formulated. In any case, 
as stated above, in order to make the main points of this chapter we do not require a more precise 
demarcation of science than that offered here. 
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be possible. This is a thought we find plausible, as will be explained in the following sections. This 
thought also indicates why the metaphysics of science has developed in precisely the way it has, i.e., 
as primarily an investigation into the nature of kinds, laws, and causation. 
    
This modal suggestion, that the metaphysics of science is an investigation of the metaphysical 
preconditions of science, has rather a Kantian flavour. But arguably, the idea that certain 
metaphysical phenomena are necessary for science was present in ancient thinking, as we will now 
see.  
 
 
3. Ancient metaphysics of science and the modal claim 
 
The well known Platonic theory of forms (or ‘ideas’) is an early example of an ontological theory of 
kinds. As well as the physical realm of mutable particulars, there is, according to Plato, a non-
physical transcendent realm of immutable kinds, which the physical particulars instantiate. Since 
Plato proposed his theory, a significant number of metaphysicians have continued to advocate kind 
ontologies of various sorts (see for example Ellis 2001, Lowe 2006), although most modern 
metaphysicians tend to avoid the claim that kinds exist in a transcendent realm. 
    
Now, in his Metaphysics, Aristotle refers to a number of arguments in support of the ontology of 
forms that he was aware of from the Platonic schools. Interestingly for our purposes, one of these is 
an argument from science, and this is perhaps one of the first exercises within the metaphysics of 
science. As Melling writes, the argument is described by Alexander as being, roughly, that ‘[I]f the 
sciences have any validity, if they can attain knowledge, then there must be a realm of immutable, 
intelligible realities which are the true objects of knowledge’ (1987, p.117). The argument thus takes 
us from the existence of science, and in particular the generalisations it gives rise to, to the thought 
that there must be objects of a kind which makes the activity of science, and specifically scientific 
knowledge, possible. Alexander articulates this thought in connection with medicine and the rational 
science of geometry: 
 
‘... if medicine is not a science of this particular health but of health simply, there will be 
a certain health-itself; and if geometry is not a science of this particular equal and this 
particular commensurate, but of equal simply and the commensurate simply, there will 
be a certain equal-itself and a commensurate-itself; and these are the Ideas” 
(Alexander, Metaphysics Commentary 79.3-88.2) 
 
The key insight here is clearly that science typically deals not with facts about particulars but rather 
facts of a more general character, or as Alexander puts it, of a simple character. This is to say that 
science typically tells us about the nature of kinds of individuals rather than specific individuals. To 
use examples from Alexander’s themes of medicine and geometry, the scientists might say for 
example that ‘penicillin cures Lyme disease’ or that the ‘square of the hypotenuse equals the square 
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of the opposite plus the square of the adjacent’. These statements are about Lyme disease in 
general and right-angled triangles in general. 
    
Now, importantly for our purposes, the Platonic argument from science has a modal force to it: 
given the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically its general character, the world needs to be 
such-and-such a way metaphysically. We may of course think that the Platonists overstep the mark 
in thinking that the nature of science leads us directly to the theory of forms. Whether irreducible 
kinds (not to mention transcendent kinds) provide the most plausible truthmakers for kind 
generalisations is a matter of ongoing controversy. Nevertheless, the general question of what the 
world needs to be like (metaphysically speaking) in order for science to be possible and scientific 
claims to be true, is one that we take to be insightful, and one that actually lies at the heart of the 
metaphysics of science, if only implicitly.
4
 One reason for thinking that this latter point holds is that it 
provides an explanation as to why the specific subject matter of the metaphysics of science is as it is. 
Let us explain.   
    
We have already highlighted that the key debates within current metaphysics of science concern the 
natures of kindhood, lawhood, causation and causal powers,
5
 but as mentioned in the last section, 
there remains a question about why these are the core topics of the discipline, aside from the fact 
that they are concepts which are found in all branches of science. Our discussion of Platonic 
metaphysics of science has suggested a possible explanation, and one which we find plausible: kinds, 
laws, causation and causal powers (whatever their metaphysical natures may turn out to be), are 
precisely what make scientific enquiry as we know it possible. Bearing in mind our earlier comments 
about the nature of science, this is to say that the aforementioned phenomena are those which 
make scientific predictions and explanations possible. In the next section, we will explore the main 
reasons for accepting this modal aspect of the metaphysics of science.  
 
 
4. Order in the world 
 
A world in which there are kinds, laws and causal powers is a world in which there is order. In such 
worlds, certain causal dispositions or powers are associated with certain natural kinds, a relationship 
which may be expressed by some of the natural laws. An example of such a relationship is that 
expressed by the law ‘electrons are negatively charged’ or ‘salt dissolves in water’. Because of the 
general character of such laws, they tell us what causal dispositions we can expect from any instance 
                                                          
4
 We accept that many will find this to be quite a strong claim, and so it is worth pointing out that most of the 
points to follow stand even if one takes the metaphysics of science to have the more modest aim of 
investigating what the world could be like in order for science as we know it to arise. (Thanks go to an 
anonymous referee for this point.) 
5
 Talk of causal powers has an anti-Humean flavour, but we do not intend the term ‘power’ to be 
metaphysically loaded (i.e., we are not ruling out here that powers are to be understood in some reductionist 
sense), 
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of the kind in question. When we encounter a new electron or a new piece of salt, we do not have to 
perform tests to determine whether that particular electron is negatively charged or that particular 
salt is soluble. The law alone tells us what to expect, and the law is made possible by the natural-
kind structure of the world and its relationship with the causal dispositions.
6
 In a chaotic, disorderly 
world in which there are no natural kind structures, and in which events occur entirely randomly, 
there would not be the patterns in nature that are required for there to be natural laws
7
. 
    
Now, it seems plausible that within this chaotic, disorderly world, it would not be possible to make 
the kinds of predictions (not to mention novel predictions) or construct the kinds of explanations 
that we find in natural science.
8
 Scientific predictions concern what will happen to certain entities, 
and in order to begin formulating a scientific prediction, we ask what kinds of thing those entities 
are. We then consider which causal dispositions things of those kinds have. Once we have 
established this, we can then identify the causal laws (typically functional laws) relevant to those 
causal dispositions. Finally, we can feed the specific data we have about the relevant entities into 
the relevant causal law(s), thereby generating data about what will happen to those individuals at 
certain points in time. In short, then, the facts about kinds and causal powers, facts which the laws 
can capture, enable scientists to deliver the kinds of systematic predictions that they do and to do so 
in a strikingly efficient way.  
    
This is not to say that, in our world, determinate predictions will always be possible (or even possible 
at all). For example, there are reasons for thinking that the causal powers at the level of quantum 
mechanics are indeterministic or ‘chancy’, which is reflected in the fact that the best laws we have in 
that domain are probabilistic. As such, any predictions based on those laws can only deliver 
probabilities about the outcomes. But such predictions are nevertheless useful, and certainly better 
than anything we could hope for in the disorderly world described earlier. A world involving 
probabilistic laws is one in which the future possibilities are narrowed down to quite a considerable 
degree. In contrast, a disorderly world is one in which anything goes: the future possibilities are not 
constrained in any way. A disorderly world should not therefore be confused with a ‘chancy’ world. 
A chancy world, unlike a disorderly one, is a scientific world.  
 
                                                          
6
 The precise nature of this relationship is itself a matter of ongoing debate in the metaphysics of science (see 
for example, Bird (2001) who argues that salt dissolves in water as a matter of metaphysical necessity. See also 
replies by Beebee (2002) and Psillos (2002), who argue the relationship between salt and solubility is 
contingent (yet regular)).  
7
 One may doubt whether this kind of world is physically possible. This question does not matter for our 
purposes. We can at least say that such a world is metaphysically possible. 
8
 Perhaps in some minimal sense we could try to make predictions in a chaotic world, if, say, a certain 
particular happened to behave in a regular way over a given period. It seems clear, though, that in such a 
world we would not be able construct the kinds of stable and systematic predictions which natural science 
delivers. 
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The modal point holds equally for the process of explanation. Let us consider the most common 
form of explanation: causal explanation.
9
 To say that an event or fact, call it X, is explained by Y is to 
say that Y is responsible for X, the paradigm case being where X is caused by Y. Notice, however, that 
in the chaotic world described above, which is void of kindhood and causation, nothing could be held 
responsible for anything else. Things would just happen, randomly, for no reason at all. For any given 
event that occurred in that world, all we could say about it is simply that ‘it just happened’. But it is 
doubtful that this is an explanation at all, and it is certainly not a scientific explanation. 
    
The precise nature of the phenomena that impose order on the world and allow science to be 
possible is a matter of ongoing debate, and our intention has not been to address any of the specific 
debates concerning the metaphysics of these phenomena. What we have tried to indicate, however, 
is how and why the study of kindhood, lawhood, causation and causal power are at the heart of the 
metaphysics of science. The reason is that it is precisely these phenomena which bring order to the 
world, and it is therefore the job of the metaphysician of science to find out just what kinds, laws, 
causal powers and causation amount to ontologically. In short, then, the metaphysics of science is 
the metaphysics of order.  
    
Taking into account the insights of the last two sections, we are now in a position to adjust our 
definition as follows: 
 
MOS def*: The metaphysical  study of the aspects of reality, such as kindhood, lawhood, 
causal power and causation, which impose order on the world and make our scientific 
disciplines possible (that is, disciplines which are able to provide predictions (often novel 
ones) and offer explanations for new facts and anomalies within their given domain). 
 
 
5. The relationship between scientific disciplines 
 
Finally, there is one important aspect of the metaphysics of science which we have not yet 
addressed, and one which we must now build into our definition. Earlier we saw how the various 
branches of science – physics, chemistry and biology, for instance – are similar in that they all trade 
on the notions of kinds, laws, and causation. But there are clearly considerable dissimilarities 
between the various branches of science. Physicists posit very different kinds of entities to, say, the 
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 Etymology suggests a very close relationship between explanation and causation. When we say Y explains X, 
we say X because Y: notice the cause in because. However, whether causal explanation is the only respectable 
kind of explanation is a matter of controversy. For example, according to one influential account of 
explanation – the deductive-nomological view (see Hempel 1965) – it is the laws which play an essential role in 
scientific explanation. But there is no need to address the details here, for that view is also consistent with our 
general thesis that world-order is a precondition of explanation (- laws being an essential aspect of world-
order). 
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chemists or the biologists, and as a result their laws look very different to those of the chemist or 
biologist. The differences are more striking still in the case of the ‘higher-level’ sciences such as 
psychology. What are we to make of these differences? What does the existence of a multitude of 
scientific disciplines, and their diversity, teach us metaphysically? Some have suspected that the 
differences are ultimately superficial, and that in principle the physicists could explain all of the 
entities and laws of the other sciences using the language of physics. This is the reductionist stance. 
It is, however, far from obvious that attempts to reduce all scientific claims to physics can ever be 
successful. For one thing, physicists who have previously attempted such reductions have 
encountered immediate hurdles. Take chemistry, for example. Whilst the laws of chemistry can in 
principle be derived from the laws of quantum electrodynamics, it seems this can only be achieved if 
certain information describing suitable chemical conditions is first fed into the equations (for further 
discussion see Gell-Mann, 1994). The prospects for explaining away chemical facts using only the 
concepts found in physics are not as bright as some had assumed. 
    
Might it be, then, that the existence of the diverse branches of science tells us that reality is layered, 
with each distinct level containing unique kinds of entities and laws? To think in this way pushes us 
towards a view known as emergentism. But this view has also been shown to face difficulties, and so 
it may be that we ultimately need a middle position, one that allows scientific disciplines other than 
physics to be legitimate in their own right, but without completely cutting them off from each other, 
and particularly not from physics. Needless to say, this issue is a matter of ongoing debate. What is 
important from our perspective is merely that the domain of the metaphysics of science seems to be 
the best arena for this debate. Scientists tend to specialise in their own branches of science, each 
with their own concerns. Even if scientists are interested in these broader questions about how the 
branches of science relate, which surely the most curious scientists are, it is beyond their remit to 
spend large amounts of time thinking about them. Their primary job as scientists, we have 
suggested, is to develop theories which have great systematic predictive and explanatory power. In 
order to tackle the broader philosophical questions, it is necessary to take a step back from any 
specific scientific practice, and as philosophers, metaphysicians of science are well positioned to do 
this. 
 
There is also perhaps a deeper reason why investigating the relationship between different branches 
of science falls naturally within the remit of metaphysics of science. We have claimed that the 
metaphysics of science is the metaphysics of order. And it seems clear that in investigating the 
relationship between the different sciences, we are likely to learn something about the order of 
world in terms of how it is fundamentally layered. Or if, for example, a strong form of reductionism 
is true, we may find that the natural world has just one layer, and that the order found in the special 
sciences is derived from the order found in physics (assuming physics is the reduction base).
10
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Taking into account this aspect of the metaphysics of science, we may now propose our final 
definition: 
 
MOS def: The metaphysical study of the aspects of reality, such as kindhood, lawhood, 
causal power and causation, which impose order on the world and make our scientific 
disciplines possible (that is, disciplines which are able to provide predictions (often novel) 
and offer explanations for new facts and anomalies within their given domain), and also the 
study of the metaphysical relationship between the various scientific disciplines. 
 
 
6. The Acid Test 
 
As a way of testing the adequacy of the definition proposed, we should consider whether it 
successfully marks off questions falling within the metaphysics of science from other metaphysical 
questions. The metaphysics of science, we have claimed, is the metaphysics of world-order. We 
must therefore consider whether the metaphysical issues falling outside of the metaphysics of 
science are independent of questions relating to the existence and nature of world-order. We 
suggest that they are. 
    
There are many branches of metaphysics, each of which concern different aspects of reality. It would 
be unrealistic for us to try to survey all the branches of metaphysics and the questions they involve. 
We can, however, provide a partial list of the core sub-disciplines of metaphysics, and briefly 
consider whether the debates in those sub-disciplines are largely independent of issues relating to 
what we have called world-order. Here are some of the main sub-disciplines: the metaphysics of 
particulars; the metaphysics of properties; the metaphysics of time; the metaphysics of space; the 
metaphysics of composition; the metaphysics of identity; the metaphysics of parthood; the 
metaphysics of persistence; the metaphysics of numbers; the metaphysics of propositions.  
    
We do not think it takes a large amount of reflection to see that the core questions within these sub-
disciplines are indeed independent of questions relating to the metaphysical nature of world-order. 
We take this to show that even though our definition may be vague in some respects, it is along the 
right lines.  
    
Let us briefly consider the first few items on the list. First, let’s take the metaphysics of particulars, 
which is a classical metaphysical topic. Are particulars made up of substances, which properties hook 
onto, or are particulars merely bundles of properties? This question is, we suggest, independent of 
the metaphysics of world-order. Consider the chaotic, disorderly world discussed earlier. Particulars 
could exist in this world, as well as a scientific world, and so questions concerning the metaphysics of 
order to do not have much, if any, bearing on this sub-discipline. 
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Take another core topic in classical metaphysics: the metaphysics of properties. Are properties best 
thought of as universals, tropes, or otherwise? Again, answers to this question do not seem to be 
constrained by facts concerning world-order. There seems no reason why entities such as tropes and 
universals should only exist in an ordered world. Furthermore, the trope versus universals debate 
can be had independently of the various debates concerning the metaphysics of order. Both realists 
and reductionists about causal dispositions can, for example, be either trope or universals theorists 
(see for example Molnar (2003) who is a trope realist about powers and Ellis (2001) who is also a 
powers realist, but prefers a universals view). This is not to say, of course, that metaphysicians of 
science are not also interested in the metaphysics of properties.  
    
Let us now briefly consider the metaphysics of time. The core question within this discipline 
concerns whether time is best conceived as the A-series or B-series. Again, this question is 
independent of issues of world-order. Time could exist in an order-less world, and the various views 
about the metaphysics of ordered worlds appear to be compatible with both the ‘A’ and ‘B’ theory 
of time.  
    
Finally, let us briefly consider the metaphysics of space, the central question of which is: is space 
absolute or relative? As we saw earlier in the chapter, this metaphysical question is one which 
scientists have debated, but it is not a primary concern of metaphysicians of science. This is because 
the outcome of this debate is independent of the metaphysical questions about world-order. The 
existence of kinds and laws, for example, are conceivable on either the absolutist or relationalist 
conceptions. 
    
Due to space constraints, we will not continue to go though each item on the list. We hope, 
however, that we have said enough to indicate that the prospects for passing the acid test are good, 
and that, upon reflection, debates outside of the metaphysics of science can be seen to lie outside of 
the metaphysics of world-order. Such reflections lend weight to our definition, for our key claim has 
been, to repeat, that the metaphysics of science is the metaphysics of order. 
 
 
7. Summary 
 
We began with the observation that, historically, debates within modern metaphysics of science 
have been centred primarily on issues relating to the natures of kindhood, lawhood, causal power 
and causation. We went on to suggest an explanation for this, which is that kinds, laws and 
causation are all what bring order to the world, and as such are needed for the very existence of 
science as we know it. The metaphysics of science is thus concerned with the preconditions of 
science: the metaphysics of science is the metaphysics of order. In the course of arguing for this 
understanding of the metaphysics of science, we also briefly considered what might demarcate 
scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines. This issue has long been a controversial one, and 
so for the purposes of this chapter we settled upon a rather minimal demarcation criterion which 
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says that scientific disciplines are those which are able to deliver systematic predictions (many of 
which are novel), and explain facts (many of which are new or previously unexplained). With this 
understanding of science in play, the necessity of kindhood, lawhood and causation for science was 
highlighted by the point that in a disorderly world (i.e., one void of kindhood, lawhood and 
causation), it would not be possible to make systematic predictions and provide explanations – that 
is, to do science.  
    
We then added to the definition proposed by identifying a further key debate within modern 
metaphysics of science: that concerning the relationship between the various scientific disciplines. 
We argued that the discipline of metaphysics of science provides the best arena for this debate, 
because scientists themselves work within, and are therefore constrained by, their own specific 
scientific disciplines. Moreover, investigating the relationship between the various branches of 
science is itself part of the project of investigating the nature of the world’s order. After adding to 
our definition in light of this observation, we finally tested the plausibility of our definition by 
considering whether it clearly marks off debates within the metaphysics of science from other 
metaphysical debates. After considering some of the core metaphysical debates outside of the 
metaphysics of science, we suggested that our definition is indeed along the right lines on the basis 
that these debates are largely independent of the existence and nature of world-order. 
 
 
8. The articles in this volume 
The aim of this volume is to provide a snap-shot of current important research on each of the core 
topics within the metaphysics of science identified above: the topics of laws, causation and 
dispositions (or ‘powers’), natural kinds, and emergence. Accordingly, the volume is divided into four 
distinct sections, with each one devoted to each topic. We will conclude this introductory chapter by 
briefly introducing the main questions and arguments in each paper, and indicating where 
appropriate how the papers within each section relate to one another. 
Section 1: Laws 
This section begins with Roberts’ ‘Measurement, Laws, and Counterfactuals’. The core issue 
addressed concerns how a certain feature of laws is to be explained. Roberts offers a new answer to 
this question, and one which will potentially shed light on how it is that scientists are able to draw 
inferences about laws. Indeed, these two broad themes – that of explaining laws and their features, 
and that of showing how law inferences are possible – are also main concerns of the other two 
papers in this section of the volume. Woodward is concerned to shed light on the nature of law (and 
also causal) inferences, while Lange is concerned with explaining a specific kind of law. As Roberts’ 
paper shows, these two broad themes are not unrelated. 
Roberts begins by noting a striking fact about the modal nature of both laws and legitimate 
measurement methods. The feature in question is that both laws and legitimate measurement 
WHAT IS THE METAPHYSICS OF SCIENCE? 16 
 
methods are counterfactually resilient. What does this mean? Well, to say that a law is 
counterfactually resilient is to say, roughly, that a genuine law (as opposed, say, to an accidental 
regularity) is one which holds across a variety of counterfactual suppositions. To say that a legitimate 
measurement method is counterfactually resilient (as opposed, say, to a method which delivers 
accurate measurements largely through luck), is to say that such methods deliver accurate 
measurements across a variety of counterfactual suppositions. But precisely which range of 
counterfactual suppositions are taken to be the relevant ones? Roberts suggests different people 
will disagree on this issue. Roberts is not concerned to settle this issue, but claims merely that 
whatever reasons one has for taking certain counterfactual suppositions to be relevant in the case of 
laws, those same reasons will also lead one to view the counterfactual resilience of measurement 
methods in the same way. 
What Roberts attempts to establish, then, is that laws and measurement methods are closely 
connected insofar as they are both counterfactually resilient in the same sorts of ways. Is there an 
underlying explanation for this connection? Roberts suggests there is, and spends the rest of paper 
arguing for a novel explanation for this connection.  
Roberts’ proposal is that the counterfactual resilience of measurement methods is what explains the 
counterfactual resilience of laws. The pay-off for accepting that the explanation runs in this direction 
is as follows. The counterfactual resilience of legitimate measurement methods can itself be 
explained, independently, by facts about epistemic norms concerning the nature of evidence, argues 
Roberts. Thus the picture Roberts presents in explanatorily rich in that the counterfactual resilience 
of both laws and (legitimate) measurement methods are explained. But on the alternative picture 
whereby the counterfactual resilience of laws is taken to be more basic than that of legitimate 
measurement methods, it is far less clear, according to Roberts, that the counterfactual resilience of 
the laws will itself be susceptible to a further explanation.  
In the second article in the laws section, ‘Laws, Causes and Invariance’, Woodward is concerned with 
the kinds of evidential reasoning scientists use to infer laws and causal claims. It is extremely 
important for metaphysicians to understand how scientific methodology works, Woodward 
suggests. For this ensures that philosophers do not end up trying to provide metaphysical 
foundations for non-existent features of science. 
The view of laws which is Woodward’s starting point is the Lewis-style Best Systems Analysis. As is 
well known, Lewis develops this theory in the context of his Humean Supervenience thesis, which 
states that all facts (which will include those concerning laws) supervene on the spatiotemporal 
distribution of particular matters of fact, each of which are themselves entirely non-modal in nature. 
On the Best Systems picture, laws consist in the axioms or theorems that occur in the strongest and 
simplest systemization of the four-dimensional distribution of non-modal facts. In short, the laws 
capture the most general regularities that occur in a world. Now, according to Woodward, part of 
the justification for the Best Systems view is that it is supposed to provide a framework which 
coheres with how law inferences and theory choice in science operate (though in a rather idealised 
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form). But the picture the Best Systems Analysis presents does not sit well with how science does 
work, Woodward claims. Woodward concedes, however, that if it is not the case that laws 
supervene on something like a Humean Supervenience base, it becomes difficult to see how 
scientists are able to establish laws though empirical testing.  
In order to overcome this dilemma, Woodward suggests we must look at how scientists actually 
draw causal and law inferences in a range of scenarios, and use these insights to help develop the 
metaphysics. This is precisely what Woodward sets about doing in this paper. By studying a range of 
examples from science, Woodward argues that the Lewisian Best Systems picture (and also the view 
of causation it lends itself to) is shown to be too simplified. In Woodward’s view, inferring laws is not 
simply a matter of applying criteria like simplicity and strength, nor is the evidential base for law 
inferences entirely non-modal in character, as Lewis’s system suggest. For example, when 
investigating causal relations and laws, scientists implement intervention and invariance principles. 
But implementing these principles requires a background of further modal beliefs. We cannot 
identify a suitable intervention method, for example, unless we already have beliefs about how that 
intervention will causally interact with the experimental elements. More generally, the empirical 
assumptions which help us to draw causal and law inferences do themselves have causal or nomic 
import, which suggests that drawing causal and nomic inferences is more complex than the Best 
Systems Analysis suggests.  
In the final paper of the laws section, Lange returns to a general theme, present in the Roberts 
paper, of explaining laws. Because laws form such a central part of any scientific theory, it is perhaps 
natural to think that laws – particularly physical laws – are explanatorily fundamental. But we should 
not be too hasty. We have already seen how Roberts, in the first paper of the volume, suggests that 
the counterfactual resilience of laws can be explained by further facts. But are physical laws in 
general ever susceptible to a deeper explanation? 
In ‘How to Explain Lorentz Transformations’, Lange provides us with a case study, and asks whether 
a certain type of law might have a deeper explanation. The laws in question are those concerning 
Lorentz Transformations. These laws emerged as a result of Einstein’s special theory of relativity 
and, roughly speaking, Lorentz transformations specify how a point-like event’s space-time co-
ordinates in one inertial frame maps onto its co-ordinates in another frame. Lorentz transformations 
play a fundamental role in the special theory of relativity, since it is essentially facts about these 
transformations which give rise to some of the most well-known and surprising consequences of the 
special theory, such as the relativity of simultaneity.  
Given the fundamental role of Lorentz transformation laws in Einstein’s theory, it is perhaps natural 
to think that they are not themselves susceptible to further explanation. Lange’s aim is to question 
this assumption, though, by exploring what various explanations of Lorentz transformations might 
look like. Perhaps the nature of Lorentz transformations can be explained in terms of what the 
fundamental force laws happen to be, for example. Or, more interestingly from a metaphysical 
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perspective, perhaps an explanation might be available in terms of the very nature of relativity and 
the geometry of space-time itself.  
This latter explanation would be deep indeed, but we cannot expect such an explanation to come 
easily. For one thing, it will require us to get a grip on how facts about relativity and space-time 
geometry (and so the Lorentz transformations themselves) can transcend the various force laws. 
Lange attempts to do just this by showing what such an explanation would be like, with the help of 
some modal metaphysics. If successful, Lange’s proposal has the striking consequence that physical 
laws – the Lorentz transformations in this case – can, in a certain sense, be explained in a non-
dynamic way. Finally, Lange shows how his explanatory strategy might be applied to laws in classical 
physics, specifically Newton’s law. 
Section 2: Causation and Dispositions 
In recent decades, disposition-based ontologies have become more and more popular in the 
metaphysics of science. On such views, at least some of the natural properties of the world are said 
to be irreducibly dispositional in character, which is to say they are, by their very nature, properties 
for certain behavioural manifestations. Because of this feature of dispositions, there is clearly a close 
connection between dispositions and causation. Indeed, Shoemaker, who was one of the first to 
propose a dispositional view of natural properties, called it the ‘causal theory of properties’ (1980). 
More recently, irreducible dispositions are often called causal powers, as is the case in the McKitrick 
article in this volume. 
But what, precisely, is the relationship between dispositions and causation? How does realism about 
dispositions impact on our understanding of causal talk and of the behavioural mechanisms in the 
world? Both of the articles in this section of the volume are concerned with these broad questions. 
In Huetteman’s ‘A Disposition-Based Process Theory of Causation’, he argues that the dispositional 
view of properties can help us to find a place for causation in physics. Since Russell’s infamous 1912 
paper, ‘On the Notion of Cause’, the concept of causation has been viewed with suspicion, 
particularly in the philosophy of physics. Russell argued that the concept of causation is too 
imprecise to be useful in physics, and that the main aims of physics can be carried out perfectly well 
without invoking causal concepts.  
Yet, in spite of Russell’s claims, and similar sceptical conclusions from others such as Mach, the 
notion of causation has continued to be employed pervasively in science – particular in the special 
sciences. Clearly, then, we need some account of why, at least in some cases, it is natural to frame 
scientific claims in causal terms. This is essentially Huetteman’s aim: to find a place for causation in 
our scientific world-view, despite Russell’s scepticism. 
Huetteman begins by motivating the claim that the notion of dispositional properties is needed in 
physics. Rather than employing purely metaphysical arguments, as some dispositional theorists do, 
Huetteman motivates the dispositional view by looking at specific examples from physics involving 
compound systems. We should accept dispositional properties, Huetteman argues, because they 
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provide the best explanation for the interactions between parts of compound physical systems. 
These dispositional properties, in turn, serve to ground the very laws governing those physical 
systems. The main example Huetteman appeals to concerns the interaction between Hamiltonian 
rotators and oscillators in quantum mechanics. 
After outlining his theory of dispositions, Huetteman then suggests how causation might then be 
understood. Notably, the view Huetteman advocates is not the view that simply sees dispositions as 
the causes of their manifestations. Although this is perhaps the most obvious way of understanding 
causation in the context of dispositionalism, Huetteman argues that this simplistic view does not sit 
well with the examples discussed from physics. 
Instead, Huetteman’s theory is based on the following central claim: a cause is a disturbing factor 
which diverts a system away from the behaviour it is naturally disposed to display (what he calls the 
‘default behaviour’). Since this theory is based on the temporal evolution of systems, it may be 
classed as a process theory of causation. After developing the details of his view, Huetteman 
identifies some favourable consequences of the view, compares the theory with other versions of 
the process theory, and finally discusses some modal implications. 
In McKitrick’s ‘How to Activate a Power’ the focus is again realism about dispositions (or what she 
calls ‘powers’). McKitrick’s main aim is to explore the relationship between a power, its 
manifestation, and the ‘triggering’ circumstances which lead to its manifestation. This relationship 
has typically been thought to be relatively unproblematic, but McKitrick’s new work suggests that 
dispositonalists may not have understood this relationship as well as they might have assumed. 
In her discussion of dispositions and their triggers, McKitrick avoids using causal language. But like 
Huetteman’s view of dispositions, the theories McKitrick discusses have potential implications for a 
theory of causation. If one takes it that the cause-effect relationship is just the relationship between 
a power and its manifestation, understanding the precise nature of triggering conditions promises to 
reveal something important about the nature of causal mechanisms. 
McKitrick’s starting point is the strongest version of dispositionalism: the view that all natural 
properties are powers (what McKitrick calls ‘pan-dispositionalism’). How, McKitrick asks, are we to 
understand a triggering event if all properties are powers? If events consist in things gaining 
different properties, as seems plausible, triggering events seem to invite a number mysteries. For a 
start, when one considers concrete examples of power manifestation, it is not always clear that a 
new distinctive power has been brought about during a triggering event. And even in cases where 
plausible candidates can be found, it is noticeable that those ‘triggering’ powers can in many cases 
exist without the manifestation event taking place. This means we then need a further story about 
what takes us from the instantiation of the ‘triggering’ power to the final manifestation event. In 
short, it seems we need a further triggering factor which serves to explain why the initial triggering 
power is activated. But this, McKitrick highlights, is a regress in the making. 
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After exploring the precise nature of this regress worry, McKitrick explores a number of possible 
solutions and draws out their implications. These solutions include the idea that triggering powers 
do not themselves require further triggers but are, rather, constantly manifesting powers. This 
solution can also be supplemented with the suggestion that these constantly manifesting  
‘triggering’ powers are typically one amongst many other triggering powers all of which must work 
in conjunction in order to give rise to the final manifestation.  After considering some problems 
facing these proposals, another solution that McKitrick considers involves dropping the assumption 
that manifestations are always the manifestation of a single power only. In the final section, 
McKitrick summarises what lessons can be learned from her discussion of these various proposals. 
Section 3: Natural kinds 
As we saw earlier in this chapter, one of the main aims of science is to categorise nature: that is, to 
find out what kinds of things there are. This categorisation project is revealed most clearly by the 
periodic table in chemistry, but natural kind terms are used pervasively in all domains of science. But 
what precisely are natural kinds? If we were to take scientific talk seriously, it would be natural to 
suppose that what scientists are doing when they identify kinds is discovering objective divisions 
that exist in the world: they are ‘carving nature at its joints’. This realist construal of natural kinds 
also lends itself to the view that each natural kind has its own essence, something in virtue of which 
it is clearly marked off from other kinds.  
But need we take natural kinds as metaphysically seriously as the above remarks suggest? In order 
to accommodate natural kind talk and the role of natural kinds in science, must we view natural 
kinds as entities which form an ineliminable ontological category of their own – and as entities with 
their own distinctive essences? The three papers in this section of the volume all address these 
general questions. Although each of the three papers approaches the metaphysics of kinds debate in 
a quite different way, their conclusions all have something in common: they express scepticism 
about the necessity and feasibility of a strong realism about kinds.  
As we saw earlier in this chapter, it was arguably Kripke and Putnam who were the catalysts for the 
modern debate on natural kinds. They famously argued that theoretical identifications of natural 
kinds, such as ‘water is H2O’, are necessary though knowable only a posteriori. This view about the 
semantics of natural kind terms was then taken by many to go hand in hand with a realist, 
essentialist view about natural kinds. In Beebee’s ‘How To Carve across The Joints in Nature Without 
Abandoning Kripke-Putnam Semantics’ she questions whether acceptance of the Kripke-Putnam 
thesis really does have these strong metaphysical implications. Beebee argues that it does not. 
Beebee’s starting point is Salmon’s view about the relationship between the Kripke-Putnam thesis 
and realist natural kind essentialism. In Salmon’s view, the Kripke-Putnam thesis does not itself 
justify natural kind essentialism. Rather, a non-trivial essentialist claim has to be presupposed in 
order to get to the necessary a posteriori claim about theoretical identities, and it is this that 
explains why the Kripke-Putnam thesis and essentialism go hand in hand. Crucially, however, this 
non-trivial essentialist claim is not one that has any of the strong metaphysical implications that 
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natural kind essentialists typically endorse, argues Beebee. The non-trivial essentialism which 
Salmon speaks of is, argues Beebee, relatively trivial by most metaphysical lights. And so one can 
happily accept the Kripke-Putnam semantics without accepting the stronger essentialist view that 
natural kind classifications somehow carve nature at its fundamental joints.  
Beebee’s central argument is that the ‘non-trivial’ essentialist claim which, according to Salmon, is 
involved in the Kripke-Putnam thesis is not one which rules out there being cross-cutting kinds. As 
Beebee shows, there are number of different senses in which kinds may be said to cross-cutting, but 
the basic idea is that if kinds cross-cut, there is no single way of carving up nature. To say that kinds 
cross-cut is to say that there are multiple taxonomic systems which each divide the world in 
different ways. That is, the categorisations of each system ‘cut across’ each other. And if none of 
these ways of dividing the world can have a claim to be more legitimate than any other, the view 
that science carves nature at its ultimate joints is undermined. Clearly, if the Kripke-Putnam thesis is 
consistent with this cross-cutting view, as Beebee claims it is, then the Kripke-Putnam thesis does 
not have the substantive metaphysical consequences many have taken it to have. Beebee concludes 
her paper by summarising the general implications these results have for the wider essentialist 
debate. 
In Tobin’s paper ‘Are Natural Kinds and Natural Properties Distinct?’, she asks what it could mean for 
a set of objects to belong to a certain kind, beyond mere facts about which natural properties those 
objects share. The reason this is an important question is that thoroughgoing realists about natural 
kinds take it that a sui generis category of substantial kinds is needed in our ontology, in addition to 
the category of properties. Yet, if it were possible to account for talk about natural kinds purely in 
terms of shared properties, what need would there be for a separate ontological category of kinds?  
Tobin argues that natural kinds can indeed be understood purely in terms of natural properties, and 
that views suggesting otherwise are unpersuasive. The upshot is that the robust realist views about 
natural kinds discussed earlier are undermined. 
Tobin begins by exploring the three main ways in which natural kinds might be accounted for in 
terms of natural properties. The first proposal, which is Lewisian, is one which relies on there being a 
fundamental distinction between properties which are perfectly natural, and those which are less 
natural. On this view, two objects are of the same kind insofar as they share the same perfectly 
natural properties. The second proposal is one which is available to those who take natural 
properties to be universals, such as Armstrong. On this view, objects are said to be members of the 
same kind insofar as they instantiate the same conjunctive property universal. The third proposal is 
Quinean in spirit and trades on the set-theoretic understanding of properties. On this view, two 
objects are of the same natural kind insofar as they belong to a set whose members share a natural 
property. Again, this approach trades on the Lewisian distinction between properties which are 
natural and those which are not. It is this distinction which prevents any set whatsoever from 
corresponding to a genuine natural kind. 
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Given the availability of the above strategies, all of which suggest a distinctive ontological category 
of natural kinds is superfluous, why is it that some metaphysicians of science have nevertheless 
maintained that a sui generis category of natural kinds is needed? It is to this question that Tobin 
now turns, with the aim of showing that these views about the distinctness of natural kinds face 
problems. 
The main argument in favour of robust natural kind realism which Tobin addresses is the one 
discussed earlier: the essentialist argument. There are different ways in which essentialists explain 
the essences of natural kinds, and Tobin examines the main strategies in turn. The first account is 
one which takes natural kind essences to be universals, the second account takes it that natural 
kinds possess a sortal essence, and the third account takes it that natural kinds possess a causal 
essence. Tobin argues that each of these strategies faces problems. This, together with the claim 
that natural kinds can be accounted for in terms of properties, leads Tobin to conclude that an 
ontological distinction between natural kinds and natural properties may not be required. 
In Paul’s ‘Realism about Structure and Kinds’, she addresses the natural kinds debate, and the 
realism debate more generally, from the perspective of theories of reference. One thing that has 
been shown in modern metaphysics of science, in some areas at least, is that metaphysics and the 
philosophy of language are not unrelated. Let us assume, for example, that metaphysical realism is 
correct: there is a mind-independent reality and our best scientific theories are objectively true. 
What precisely does this mean, say, in the case of scientific claims about the natural-kind structure 
of the world? Well, for one thing, in order for metaphysical realism to hold, it looks like the terms in 
our theories – natural kind terms in this case – must have a determinate reference. For if this were 
not the case, it would no longer be clear how  our natural-kind theories could trace out the 
objective, natural kind divisions in the world. More generally, it would be difficult to see how any 
aspect of our theories latches onto a mind-independent world, if reference is indeterminate. 
Therefore, one way of assessing the feasibility of natural kind realism – and metaphysical realism in 
general – is to evaluate the claim that reference is determinate.  
Paul begins her assessment by outlining the two main theories of determinate reference: the causal 
theory and the descriptive theory (the causal version of descriptivism being the most promising, 
according to Paul). Paul suggests that the best overall theory of reference is likely to be one which 
combines both of these approaches. In the case of fundamental physics, causal descriptivism is most 
appropriate, according to Paul, though this may not be true of all areas. Since Paul’s primary interest 
is in fundamental physics, she focuses mainly on causal descriptivism for the purposes of this article.  
Paul then moves to a discussion of one of the most influential worries concerning realist theories of 
reference: Putnam’s model-theoretic argument. The argument says, roughly, that an (ideal) scientific 
theory can always be modelled in a way which maps it onto the world in multiple, equally legitimate 
ways (i.e., ways in which the theory comes out true). On each of these mappings, the terms in the 
theory will denote different things, and since according to Putnam there is no question of saying 
which mapping is the correct one, we must accept that reference is radically indeterminate.  
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After discussing the key assumptions lying behind this objection, Paul discusses the Lewisian 
response, which trades on the objective samenesses and differences in nature. Paul argues that 
while this response avoids the conclusion that nearly any interpretation of a scientific theory will 
make it come out as true, it may still be the case that more than one interpretation would make it 
come out as true. This argument is based on the possibility of what Paul calls the ‘permutability’ of 
structure and kinds. If permutability is possible in our world, then reference appears indeterminate 
to some extent, despite Lewis’s insights. 
The obvious realist answer, Paul suggests, is to deny that the actual kind-structure of the world 
happens to be such that it is indeed permutable. But this, Paul argues, weakens the realist’s position 
significantly, since it makes the success of realism hostage to what look like contingent properties of 
the world’s structure. Thus, a new important problem has been identified for the realist view. 
 
Section 4: Emergence 
Some complex natural systems which are the target of scientific investigation are said to be 
nonlinear. To say that a system in nonlinear is to say, broadly speaking, that the overall features and 
/ or behaviours of the system cannot be seen as arising purely out of the additive combinations of 
the features and / or behaviours of the elements composing the system. For obvious reasons, the 
discovery of such systems has traditionally been taken to show that a version of the emergentist 
view of nature (outlined earlier in the chapter) must be correct, at least in the case of some scientific 
areas. 
But precisely what bearing does nonlinearity have on questions concerning emergence? Is 
nonlinearity always a mark of robust metaphysical emergence, rather than mere epistemological 
emergence? If so, precisely what kind of metaphysical emergence do cases of nonlinearity suggest? 
In particular, does such emergence imply the falsity of physicalism, the view that all facts about the 
world are reducible to physical facts? These are the questions which Wilson addresses in her paper 
‘Nonlinearity and Metaphysical Emergence’.  
Wilson begins with a historical discussion about how, in the British Emergentist tradition particularly, 
nonlinearity was taken to be sufficient for strong metaphysical emergence. Strong metaphysical 
emergence in the British Emergentists’ sense was taken to occur when complex entities or systems 
could be said to be subject to new laws, laws over-and-above the physical laws governing the 
components of those entities or systems. Strong emergence in this sense implies the rejection of 
physicalism, and strikingly, it was thought that the apparent existence of nonlinear systems showed 
precisely that physicalism is false. As Wilson explains, however, cases of nonlinearity were since 
discovered which did not plausibly involve new laws (such as population growth for example), 
suggesting that the traditional account of metaphysical emergence was too strong. Wilson does 
suggest, though, that it would be beneficial if a more plausible, nuanced definition of strong 
metaphysical emergence could be formulated, to help us to distinguish between physically 
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acceptable cases of nonlinearity and cases of nonlinearity which violate physicalism. Wilson 
concludes the opening section by offering just this. 
Wilson then moves on to the contemporary debate about nonlinearity, in particular views which say 
there are cases of nonlinearity involving properly emergent features or behaviours, but emergence 
of a kind which is compatible with physicalism (i.e., ‘weak’ emergence). Wilson argues, however, 
that none of these views (e.g. those of Newman, Bedau and Batterman) succeed in providing a 
notion of emergence which is genuinely metaphysical. These accounts of emergence, Wilson argues, 
are either obviously epistemic from the start, or appeal to cases in which the alleged ‘emergent’ 
features could in principle be ontologically reduced, thereby generating a merely representational 
form of emergence. 
Does this mean that we should give up altogether on the prospect of establishing genuine (weak) 
metaphysical emergence in some cases of nonlinearity? Wilson suggests not, and sets about 
formulating a new definition of weak emergence which is genuinely metaphysical in nature and yet 
is compatible with physicalism. The formulation in question is based on the thought that 
metaphysical emergence involves the elimination of degrees of freedom, which set the parameters 
needed to describe an entity or system as being in a characteristic state. More precisely, Wilson 
claims that an entity is weakly emergent if the system out of which it arises has degrees of freedom 
some of which are eliminated relative to the composing entities. After establishing this formulation, 
Wilson argues that the emergence involved here is genuinely metaphysical and that, strikingly, there 
are actual cases of nonlinearity which plausibly have precisely this feature. 
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